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Twenty years have passed since the Bantustans were reintegrated 
into South Africa. Yet for the 17 million people still living in these 
former homelands, the struggle for full recognition of their land 
rights persists. The post-1994 government refers to the former 
homelands as ‘communal areas’ (Communal Land Tenure Policy 
2013). For most people living in these areas, their rights to land 
are uncertain and vulnerable. 
The right to security of land tenure – that is, the legal and practical 
ability to defend one’s ownership, occupation, use of and access 
to land from interference by others – is enshrined in Section 25(6) 
of the Constitution. The Constitution further prescribes that the 
government should enact a law to provide for the realisation of the 
right to security of tenure in Section 25(9). Land tenure reform 
is one of the three main areas of the government’s land reform 
programme – the other two are land redistribution (related to 
Section 25(2), (3) and (4)), which involves tackling the unequal 
distribution of land in the country resulting from the apartheid 
era, and restitution (Section 25(7)), which is about restoring 
land to or providing equivalent compensation to people who were 
dispossessed of rights to land as a result of racially discriminatory 
laws or practices. 
While laws to promote tenure security for farm dwellers and labour 
tenants have been enacted, there is no legislation beyond the Interim 
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) to secure the land 
rights of people living in the former Bantustans. The IPILRA was 
introduced in 1996 as a temporary solution that would protect people 
living in the former homelands from being deprived of their land 
rights. Despite the post-1994 constitutional requirement that the state 
should secure the land tenure of people in all of South Africa, it has 
so far failed to do so. This legislative ‘vacuum’ has contributed to the 
insecure nature of people’s land rights in ‘communal areas’. The ‘state’ 
or ‘government’ is referred to throughout this article with the awareness 
that it is not homogenous but made up of different and sometimes 
contradictory actors (Cooper 2005; Berry 1992).
Communal land tenure is a strongly debated term. It was employed 
by the colonial and apartheid governments in a crude or simplistic 
way, to describe African customary land tenure systems as ‘group-
based’, that is, opposite to individual property ownership in Europe. 
To reclaim the term ‘communal land tenure’, it is necessary to 
recognise that it is not a single system that can be legislated and 
centrally controlled. The term carries greater clarity when used to 
describe a variety of local, regionally specific land tenure practices 
that maintain common characteristics that set them apart from 
individual, private property (Cousins 2008). While communal 
tenure practices are common in the former Bantustans, they are 
not limited to these areas. 
This paper focuses on communal tenure reform developments (or 
lack thereof), referring to law, policy and practice in rural areas 
in South Africa. It shows that communal land tenure is not in a 
healthy state and discusses the following recent laws and policies 
that are symptoms of this ill health: 
• the Communal Land Rights Act (struck down by the 
Constitutional Court);
• the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 
(passed in 2003); and
• the 2014 Communal Land Tenure ‘wagon wheel’ policy 
(currently in place). 
The paper also explores the historical roots of the 
insecurity of tenure with which millions of South Africans 
struggle, diagnoses some of the causes of the failures 
of communal land tenure reform and suggests some 
alternatives that might provide the remedies needed.
1. INTRODUCTION
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Before discussing contemporary interpretations of communal land 
tenure, it’s useful to be aware of its historical baggage. Colonial 
administrators had a distorted perception of communal land 
tenure, believing it involved a system of collective land ownership 
at the expense of any individual interest (Cross 1991). Colonial 
administrators also interpreted the land to vest solely in a chief as 
the representative of the ‘collective’ (Bennett 2008). 
The former Bantustans or homelands refer to the ten areas of land 
designated by the apartheid government in the 1950s as separate 
‘ethnic’ zones where black people would live.1 Historians have 
noted that the key idea behind the Bantustans was that black 
people would be citizens of ‘ethnic’ and ‘self-governing’ homelands 
rather than of South Africa itself (Evans 1997; Beinart 2001; 
Mager 1999). In addition, while being separate from South Africa, 
the apartheid government sought to keep black people close 
enough to serve as a source of cheap labour for whites (Legassick 
and Wolpe 1976). 
With the creation of the Bantustans, the apartheid government 
entrenched the link between communal land tenure and notions 
of tribal identity. The apartheid government tried to shut down 
the wide variety of land tenure practices in the areas designated 
as Bantustans. For example, they made it illegal for Africans to 
hold individual titles to property, arguing that this would erode 
‘communal land tenure’ – that is, the government’s version of it 
(Evans 1997). As the government’s White Paper on the Tomlinson 
Report argued in 1956 (quoted by Evans 1994: 187): ‘individual 
tenure would undermine the whole tribal structure. The entire 
order and cohesion of the tribe…is bound up with the fact that the 
community is a communal unit…’ This misreading of communal 
tenure systems and its link to ‘tribes’ continues to confuse 
2. WHAT IS COMMUNAL LAND TENURE?
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discussions around communal land tenure laws and policies in 
South Africa today. 
New scholarship argues that communal tenure practices have 
historically encompassed various characteristics, and continue to 
do so today (Lund 2002; Peters 2002; Berry 2002; Cousins 2008; 
Claassens and Gilfillan 2008; Kingwill 2008). The paragraphs that 
follow describe some of these characteristics, particularly regarding 
how they differ from the individual, private property model 
accounted for in the common law of South Africa.2 They also refer 
to the variety of communal land tenure arrangements across time 
and place.
Cousins (2008) describes land rights in communal tenure as 
‘socially embedded’ and inclusive, meaning that individuals and 
families hold relative rights to the same residential and agricultural 
land. These individuals and families also negotiate access, relative 
to other individuals and families, to ‘common property resources 
such as grazing, forests and water’ (Cousins 2008: 129). This is 
unlike private property rights in South African common law, which 
tends to involve a surveyed parcel of land and a person or legal 
entity who holds an exclusive title deed to that parcel. Perhaps one 
way to describe the ‘socially embedded’ nature of communal tenure 
arrangements is to conceptualise them as ‘bundles of rights’. 
The sticks in the bundles represent objects of value (such 
as land, houses or cattle), for which stakeholders (such as 
individuals, groups or parts of groups, states etc.) have rights and 
responsibilities regarding other stakeholders (Von Benda-Beckman 
et al 2009). For example, when people in Kalkfontein purchased 
land in the 1920s, they set up dikgotla (committees) made up of 
experienced men to negotiate the interests of individuals in relation 
to the wider group (Claassens and Gilfillan 2008). As a result of 
pressure from within Kalkfontein, over time women also became 
part of the dikgotla that make decisions about land, meaning that 
women’s claims on land were also being weighed up in relation to 
men’s and other women’s interests (Claassens and Gilfillan 2008). 
In addition, whereas the rules as to who can make decisions 
about the use, transfer or disposal of private property tends to 
be regulated by statute, under communal tenure these decisions 
are made at various levels of a community. Although the colonial 
and apartheid governments tried to concentrate decision-making 
power over land in a traditional leader, in practice administration 
of communal land is ‘nested’ or ‘layered’ in nature (Cousins 2008: 
125). This means that people and groups who are consulted in 
decisions about land include individuals, families or households, 
kinship networks and wider communities. For example, Schapera 
describes the Tswana system as ‘one of ever-widening jurisdiction 
extending upwards from the household’ (Cousins 2008: 123).
He describes how a man intending to acquire land would first ask 
his father for permission to use family land, then if that land was 
unavailable, he would ask his neighbour for nearby land, and if 
that did not work he would consult the headmen for other land 
in the vicinity (Cousins 2008: 123). In other communal tenure 
situations, headmen and chiefs play a greater role in decisions 
about land. For instance, in parts of KwaZulu-Natal traditional 
leaders approve land allocations that have been decided upon at 
other levels of the group or community (Alcock and Hornby 2004). 
However, even in these situations chiefs are by no means the only 
people who make decisions about land (Alcock and Hornby 2004).
The examples show that communal land tenure is not as narrowly 
defined as colonial and apartheid administrators made it out to be. 
Communal tenure practices sometimes involved purchases, involved 
When the Kalkfontein co-purchasers secured 
the farms in the 1920s, they relied on familiar 
indigenous values and structures in setting 
up their internal relations and ownership 
rights. Both communities chose a kgotla of 
experienced and respected men to hear and 
decide internal disputes, and to mediate and 
balance the rights of individual heirs and their 
families against the interests of the wider 
groups.
Claassens and Gilfillan (2008: 305)
When at a meeting in Kalkfontein in 2004, a 
question about land allocation processes led to 
a spirited debate about the rights of women. 
In Kalkfontein there is an allocation sub-
committee. At the time all the members were 
men. The women at the meeting challenged 
why this should be the case and extracted a 
promise from the trustees to the effect that 
the vacancies on the committee would be filled 
by women.
Claassens and Gilfillan (2008: 307)
Who is consulted in decisions 
about land?
Individuals, families or 
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land law through the lens of common law from their own countries 
(Bennett 2004). Their use of the concept of ‘ownership’ played a 
pivotal role in the distortion of customary land systems (Bennett 
2004). The concept denoted the absolute concentration of interests 
in land in a single holder (Bennett 2004). Since they could not 
identify ‘ownership’ of this form in customary land tenure systems, 
colonial administrators declared ‘ownership’ foreign to customary 
law. Hence colonial officials developed the notion of customary 
land tenure as ‘collective’ in nature or as a form of ‘trust’ law (in 
which a chief held land in trust for a tribe) (Bennett 2004).
However, several scholars argue that living customary tenure 
systems are hybrid bodies of law, rules and practices (Peters 2002; 
Lund 2002). In Rabula in the Eastern Cape, for instance, titling 
became part of living customary law as black landowners adapted 
‘titling to their particular needs and continued to apply norms and 
practices based on customary principles of property management’ 
(Kingwill 2008: 185). It is these sorts of shifting practices that 
have informed the variety of communal tenure arrangements in 
South Africa. Scholars have noted that while customary land tenure 
systems draw on various repertoires about land rights, they are also 
subject to the ebbs and flows of power (Cousins and Hall 2013; 
Peters 2002). 
 
While ‘communal land tenure’ carries with it a great deal of 
historical baggage, the recognition of the land rights of millions of 
South Africans living in the former homelands depends upon an 
attempt to reclaim the term – and, in the process, to acknowledge 
the many, complex arrangements of rights in land existing in 
practice that make up communal land tenure. 
rights to land at the level of individuals and not just a ‘collective’, 
and involved decisions at the level of various social units, not just 
that of the chief. While communal tenure arrangements vary to 
the extent that a rigid set of rules would do them an injustice, they 
contain enough commonalities to establish a legal framework. 
However, such a framework would need to formally recognise 
the rights that people hold under communal tenure arrangements 
while remaining flexible enough to accommodate a variety of local 
communal tenure practices. A legal framework for communal tenure 
would need to draw on living customary law which largely informs 
de facto communal tenure arrangements.
Living customary law is different from official customary law, 
which, in relation to communal land tenure, was ‘produced out of 
colonial misunderstandings and politically expedient appropriations 
and allocations of land’ (Peters 2002: 85). One of the prevailing 
tendencies of colonial administrators was to interpret customary 
The justifiable reminder about the ambiguities 
and indeterminances in land tenure should 
not lead us to privilege cases of ‘ongoing 
interpretation’ of rights over those where only 
some people have the power to interpret, 
define and claim rights and where others 
lose out in the struggles over controlling 
interpretation and access. 
Pauline Peters (2002: 55–56) 
3. A WEIGHTY BURDEN: LAND LAWS AND POLICIES   
UNDER WHITE RULE
A series of measures implemented under colonialism and 
apartheid have shaped the context in which communal land tenure 
arrangements operate. If the current government intends to secure 
the rights of people practising communal tenure arrangements, this 
is a burden it must understand and confront. As mentioned above, 
the Dutch and British colonial governments, in asserting constructs 
of exclusive ownership, did not recognise indigenous systems of 
land as property rights. Through the recognition of ownership rights 
at the expense of local or customary land rights, colonial regimes 
justified categorising vast areas of African-held land as ‘Crown 
Land’ (land owned by the British Crown). Some of this land was 
then granted to white settlers.
The Land Acts 
The 1913 Land Act was one of a series of laws that dispossessed 
black people of their land and rendered their rights to land 
insecure. One of the Act’s intentions was to further sideline the 
African farming class and to force black people into becoming 
labourers in the cities or on the mines (Bundy 1979). About fifteen 
years later, the 1927 Native Administration Act codified African 
customary law in a distorted way. This version of customary law 
gave traditional leaders powers over land they had not historically 
enjoyed, while simultaneously downplaying the usage, occupation 
and inheritance rights of most people within indigenous systems of 
land rights (Delius 2008). 
The 1936 Native Trusts and Land Act consolidated the African 
reserves slightly (from 7% to 13% of the country), making 
available certain areas of ‘Trust’ land alongside the existing 
reserves as ‘resettlement areas’ for black people whom the 
government planned to remove from ‘white’ land (Mager 
1999). African occupation of Trust land was conditional on 
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the payment of yearly fees or rents, with the ownership of 
the land vesting in the South African Native Trust (SANT). 
The 1936 Act also established the ‘six native rule’, which again 
distorted indigenous tenure systems in favour of an autocratic 
model that was easier for the state to control (Claassens 2008). 
According to the rule, any group of more than six black people 
who had cooperated to buy land had to constitute themselves as 
a tribe under a chief or they would lose their land. This was to 
pre-empt land-buying syndicates from constituting themselves 
democratically. The ‘six native rule’ was rooted in the prevailing 
colonial assumption that all blacks were tribal subjects as opposed 
to active citizens, able to create their own identities and choose the 
legal arrangements that suited them.
The ‘Betterment’ Programme
The apartheid period saw the onset of more extreme congestion 
on the land. During the 1960s, the government enforced the 
Betterment Programme under the pretext of combating congestion, 
poverty, soil erosion and over-stocking, and improving agricultural 
production (De Wet 1995). But Betterment policies had little effect 
on reducing poverty, congestion and landlessness in the reserves 
(if that ever was the intention); if anything, they accelerated the 
process. Furthermore, Proclamation R188 of 1969 introduced 
‘Permission to Occupy’ (PTO) certificates to be issued to black 
people. However, these certificates, like other land categories 
available to black people, made their land rights conditional and 
precarious (Okoth-Ogendo 2008). The material conditions of life 
in the homelands, combined with rigid state land laws imposed on 
black people, made it increasingly difficult for people to survive off 
the land. A main feature of these laws and policies was that they 
prohibited black people from holding and managing land in a way 
that put them on an equal footing with white landowners (Okoth-
Ogendo 2008). 
A main feature of these laws and policies 
was that they prohibited black people from 
holding and managing land in a way that 
put them on an equal footing with white 
landowners.
Imposed system of authority
At the same time that the apartheid government dispossessed black 
people of their land and forcibly removed them to rural homelands, 
they imposed on them a particular system of chiefs and tribal 
authorities. The apartheid government believed that chiefs were the 
sole African decision-makers in respect of ‘communal’ land. This 
version of power over land undermined customary practices that 
recognised the entitlements vesting in ordinary people and the role 
of groups in vetting and approving applications for land – in other 
words, the many bundles of rights that characterise communal 
tenure (Delius 2008). Apartheid’s legal, military and economic 
apparatus helped chiefs protect their positions by suppressing 
structures that threatened their power, including social movements 
and organisations (Ntsebeza 2008). 
Exclusion of women
In the context of severe land shortages and insecure land rights, 
women were increasingly excluded from access to land. Unwilling 
to recognise the reality of unequal distribution of land between 
blacks and whites as a problem of its own making, the state aimed 
to address land scarcity and congestion by excluding women 
from access to land in the reserves, on the basis of a distorted 
version of customary law (Weinberg 2013). Magistrates and Bantu 
Affairs Commissioners increasingly told complainants that women 
!
The history of land purchasers who identified as ‘Bafokeng’ in the north of the country (today’s North West 
province) shows how chiefs and their advisors came to be seen as the sole ‘representatives’ of ‘tribes’ – even before 
the 1936 Act was passed. In a court case in 1906 (Hermansberg Missionary Society vs. Commissioner of Native 
Affairs and Daniel Mogale), Judge Innes determined that in order for a purchaser to buy land from a tribe, they 
must receive the tribe’s consent (Eberhard 2014). But he defined ‘consent’ as the chief’s agreement in consultation 
with his councillors – this despite a Bafokeng chief testifying that the entire pitso (gathering of all the married men 
in the tribe) should be consulted to give ‘consent’ (Eberhard 2014). In the cases that followed, groups identifying 
as part of the Bafokeng contested their right to hold land as groups separate from the chief. However, the judges in 
these cases found that a ‘section of a tribe’ could not hold land apart from the Bafokeng ‘tribe’ yet still identify as 
‘Bafokeng’ (Eberhard 2014).
The legal fallacies and assumptions used 
to justify appropriation of land by colonial 
governments and post-colonial elites were, 
and remain, essentially ideological in nature.
Okoth-Ogendo (2008: 98)
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PHOTO 1 Women discuss land reform at a meeting organised by the Land Access Movement of South Africa in Mpumalanga (2014)
could not inherit or manage land in their own right because it 
was not ‘customary’ to do so. Instead, they said that the head of 
a household, who they believed was always a man, would make 
decisions about land for the benefit of the family (Weinberg 2013). 
In this way, officials used the notion of ‘communal’ and ‘customary’ 
tenure to justify the exercise of state power over black people, as 
well as discrimination against women.
Inherited legacy
Although black South Africans interacted with and resisted the 
legal institutions imposed on them, as well as the discourses 
informing these institutions, a situation of conditional land tenure 
nevertheless became the norm for black South Africans under 
apartheid (Cross 1991). When it came to power in 1994, South 
Africa’s first democratic government inherited this legacy. 
4. COMMUNAL TENURE LEGISLATION: WHAT’S AT STAKE?
The former Bantustans – where the government understands 
‘communal tenure’ to be the norm – are home to an estimated 
16.5 million people. As a result, the government’s failure to 
carry out widespread tenure reform in these areas affects about 
a third of South Africa’s population. Since 59% of those living in 
the former homelands are women, they are particularly affected 
by uncertainty around ‘communal tenure’ arrangements. 
During the negotiations for a democratic South Africa in the 1990s, 
there was much debate about the extent to which the existing 
property regime should be protected, since it was skewed in 
favour of existing (mostly white) landowners. A compromise was 
reached in terms of which the Constitution would protect private 
property rights, but this would be balanced by measures intended 
to redress racial imbalances – specifically in the form of restitution 
and redistribution of land, as well as land tenure reform in the 
country as a whole. Sections 25(6) and (9) of the Constitution 
are particularly relevant (although not limited) to the 16.5 million 
people living in the former Bantustans. Those sections need the 
enactment of legislation to secure the tenure rights of people who 
are insecure because of past racial discrimination.
People living under 
communal tenure 
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formally recorded as such in the register of land rights (Land Rights 
Bill 1999).
The IPILRA remains a crucial law that can be used to protect 
people against deprivation of their informal rights to land, except 
under very exceptional circumstances. But the IPILRA was only 
intended as temporary legislation that would provide a safety net 
to people who did not have land titles (Claassens 2000). What is 
truly needed is tenure reform legislation that will legally recognise 
informal land rights held according to ‘living’ land tenure practices, 
so that they are on an equal footing with individual property titles 
(Okoth-Ogendo 2008). At the same time, this legislation must take 
account of and allow for enquiries into the contestations (claims 
Section 25(6): A person or community whose tenure of land 
is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an 
Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or 
to comparable redress.
Section 25(9): Parliament must enact the legislation 
referred to in subsection (6).
Constitution 
Chapter 2 Bill of Rights
DEFINITION
Beneficial occupation:
This is when people occupy land for a long time ‘as 
if they were the owner’, but without formal, legal 
rights. It is an important category in South Africa 
where many black people were denied legal rights to 
land, but had, in practice, occupied and used it as if 
they were the owners for many years. 
5. GOVERNMENT’S TRACK RECORD: LAND LAWS AND   
POLICIES POST 1994
The Mandela government (1994–1999)
To realise the right to security of tenure, South Africa’s first 
democratic government needed to pay attention to the historical 
baggage accumulated by the communal land tenure model, 
strengthen land rights in law and practice, and move towards the 
fulfilment of the population’s basic needs (Cousins 2008). 
Under the first Minister of Land Affairs, Derek Hanekom, the 
strategy was to consult widely and incorporate many of the 
suggestions put forward by people in rural areas. Bearing in mind 
the role of the apartheid government in dispossessing black people 
of their land, policymakers in the Department of Land Affairs saw 
an urgent need to secure the land rights of black South Africans 
against powerful actors, including the state (Cousin and Hall 
2013). This led to the enactment of the Interim Protection of 
Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA) in 1996 and development of the 
Land Rights Bill (LRB) in 1999. 
Informal rights to land are defined broadly, and include those who 
use, occupy or access land in terms of: 
• customary laws and practices;
• beneficial occupation; or 
• land vested in the South African Development Trust, or a 
so-called self-governing territory, or the governments of the 
former Bantustans, or any other kind of trust established by 
statute. 
The IPILRA also covers any person who holds a right to land in 
terms of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act but who was not 
If the government does not develop legislation to secure the rights 
of millions of people living in the former Bantustans, it risks 
reneging on the constitutional requirement in Section 25(6) – and 
could be found wanting if challenged in court. Beyond breaking a 
promise preserved in the Constitution, it will also rub salt into the 
wounds of people nursing the economic and psychological injuries 
of over 100 years of dispossession. 
It has become evident that valuable natural resources are 
present in the former Bantustans. This is particularly the case 
along the ‘platinum belt’ in the North West province. In this 
region people have been locked in battles with traditional 
leaders like Nyalala Pilane of the Bakgatla ba Kgafela, who 
has entered into lucrative deals with mining companies 
apparently on behalf of the tribe. In the process many other 
people who identify as Bakgatla ba Kgafela have been excluded 
from the wealth Pilane has accrued (Matlala 2013). 
The contested status of ‘communal land tenure’ in South Africa  |  13
What is truly needed is tenure reform 
legislation that will legally recognise informal 
land rights held according to ‘living’ land tenure 
practices, so that they are on an equal footing 
with individual property titles
Okoth-Ogendo (2008)
and counter-claims) and inequality of power relations involved in 
determining ‘living’ land law (Claassens 2000). 
The LRB moved to create relative ‘protected rights’ vested in 
individuals who use, occupy and have access to land (Claassens 
2000). Protected rights would be secured by statute, making 
them enforceable immediately, even before the complex processes 
entailed in enquiring into, and resolving cases of overlapping and 
disputed rights on a case-by-case basis was completed (Claassens 
2000). Minister Thoko Didiza withdrew the LRB when she took 
office, on the basis that it was too complicated and costly to 
implement (Claassens 2000).
The Mbeki and Zuma governments  
(1999–2014)
Four main issues have characterised most land laws and policies 
since 1999: 
• the government’s failure to introduce a law to secure the 
rights of people living in the former homelands; 
• the extension of traditional leaders’ power  over land;
• a lack of support for land reform beneficiaries, including 
Communal Property Associations; and
• an attitude of paternalism towards people in rural areas – that 
is, excluding people with limited resources from the ability to 
make decisions about land matters.
Failure to secure the land rights of people 
living in the former homelands
Between 1999 and 2014, power over land has been removed 
further from the hands of people in rural areas, and placed in 
the hands of elites. An example is the Mala Mala restitution 
claim, where the landowners received nearly R1 billion (around 
a third of the total annual budget for land reform) from the state 
in compensation for their land (Ashton 2014). Analysts have 
argued that, particularly in terms of restitution, the state has paid 
landowners inflated prices for their land (Aliber 2015). This could 
be tackled by the state offering to compensate landowners (most 
of whom are white) at below the market rate and expropriating if 
the owners dig in their heels (these strategies are both in line with 
the Constitution) (Aliber 2015). Some analysts have argued that 
the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ policy has made obtaining land for 
restitution prohibitively expensive, slowing down the pace of land 
reform and exhausting the state’s budget (Lahiff 2007; Ntsebeza 
2007). Lahiff (2007) argues that since most landowners of 
commercial farms in South Africa are still white, the ‘willing buyer, 
willing seller’ policy has failed to adequately tackle the structural 
causes of racial inequality in landholdings. The high sums paid 
over to landowners have also reinforced a hierarchy of land tenure 
systems, with private property at the apex as the most powerful 
and most valuable. 
Michael Aliber argues that analysts have overstated the role played 
by ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ in the failure of land reform. He 
argues that the biggest problem with South Africa’s land reform 
programme is how it approaches compensation of land owners, 
not the pace at which it works (Aliber 2015: 159). While a slow 
pace is difficult to remedy, compensation might be easier to tackle. 
He suggests that the state expropriate in the case of restitution but 
stick with ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ in the case of redistribution 
…more effort is required to ensure that the 
empirical reality – that is, the persistence of 
indigenous principles, values and institutions, 
to the extent that they do not impede social, 
cultural and economic progress – is reflected in 
and forms part of the living law in Africa.
Okoth-Ogendo (2008: 107)
!
In the Mala Mala restitution claim, the ‘Mhlanganisweni community’ lodged a claim for land from which they 
were dispossessed in the 1950s. The land under claim includes the MalaMala Game Reserve, a world-renowned 
game park owned by the Rattray family. Since the claimants, state and landowners were unable to reach an 
agreement, the claim went to the Land Claims Court. There, Judge Antonie Gildenhuys found that it would not 
be in the ‘public interest’ to restore the land to the claimants, as the cost required for the state to compensate the 
landowners would be too great. The cost was set at a market rate of R791 million. The claimants disagreed with 
this judgment and were intending to take the matter to the Constitutional Court when the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform intervened. Despite the Constitution allowing the state to compensate landowners 
for less than the market rate, the state ended up paying the Rattrays R1 billion for the Mala Mala reserve, wiping 
out most of the land restitution budget in the process.
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as the state is able to shop around for better prices (Aliber 2015: 
159). However, he does not explain exactly how this will address 
the structural racial inequalities in landholdings that persist today. 
As well as treading carefully with commercial farmers, the 
government has put in place land policies and laws that serve 
the interests of traditional leaders (in the belief they can secure 
the rural vote). The problem is not that these laws recognise 
the institution of traditional leadership, but that they condone 
traditional leaders’ abuses of power. This was most clearly evident 
in the Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA), enacted just before 
the general elections in 2004. Many rural people argued that the 
CLRA would have undermined their security of land tenure because 
it gave traditional leaders and councils wide-ranging powers, 
including control over the occupation, use and administration of 
communal land. 
 
The CLRA reinvigorated the combination of economic and political 
subjugation that existed under apartheid’s Bantustan system. 
The Department of Land Affairs (as the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform – DRDLR – was then known) said 
that chiefs would make decisions on behalf of people because it 
would be ‘customary’ for them to do so – even though the historical 
evidence disputes this (Delius 2008).
In 2010, the Constitutional Court struck down the CLRA. The 
Court found the Act unconstitutional on the technical ground that 
Parliament had followed an incorrect consultation process in terms 
of the Constitution. Although the Court avoided the substantive 
issues raised by the applicants, the discussion generated as a result 
of the case made it clear that many people in rural areas were 
against traditional leaders holding absolute power over the land on 
which they lived (Cousins and Hall 2013). For example, Stephen 
Tongoane from Kalkfontein explained that people in his area wished 
to manage their land independently of the traditional council in 
their jurisdiction, as that council was derived from a tribal authority 
imposed on them under apartheid (Claassens and Gilfillan 2008).
While the CLRA no longer exists, other laws and bills that vest 
power in traditional leaders remain a threat to rural peoples’ 
security of tenure. The Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act (TLGFA) entrenches the boundaries of the tribal 
authorities established under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951. 
Laws like the TLGFA and the Traditional Courts Bill (TCB) 
marginalise women’s voices, shifting the balance of power more 
towards male household heads and traditional leaders (Thipe 
2013). This situation affects single women the most, particularly 
those without male family members, who have little status in the 
eyes of some traditional leaders and structures (Thipe 2013). 
The traditional leadership laws, like the CLRA, try to foreclose the 
ability of groups in the former homelands to constitute themselves 
independently of traditional authorities.
The DRDLR introduced several new proposals in 2013 and 
2014, which will impact the communal tenure situation 
in South Africa. These include policies on communal land 
tenure itself, land redistribution, state land leasing and 
recapitalisation and development, as well as laws like the 
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act and the 
Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act. The new laws 
and policies reflect few of the suggestions put forward during 
the various consultation meetings and working groups often 
referred to by the DRDLR. In addition, they often contradict 
each other, take little account of past mistakes and have the 
potential to undermine rural peoples’ security of tenure. 
The new laws and policies reflect few of the 
suggestions put forward during the various 
consultation meetings and working groups 
often referred to by the DRDLR. In addition 
they often contradict each other, take 
little account of past mistakes and have 
the potential to undermine rural peoples’ 
security of tenure.
Expanded power for traditional leaders and 
traditional councils over land
The new Communal Land Tenure Policy (CLTP) (also known as 
the ‘wagon wheel’ policy – see Figure 2 below – published 8 
September 2014), like the CLRA, proposes to transfer the ‘outer 
boundaries’ of ‘tribal’ land in the former Bantustans to ‘traditional 
councils’. The CLTP suggests that title deeds will be transferred to 
other entities like Communal Property Associations (CPAs) only in 
communal areas where traditional councils do not exist. Traditional 
councils will be title holders in ‘conventional traditional communal 
areas’ while Communal Property Institutions (CPIs) will exist 
DEFINITIONS
Communal Property Associations (CPAs):
CPAs are landholding institutions that were established so 
that groups of people could come together to form a legal 
entity to acquire, hold and manage property received through 
the restitution, redistribution and land reform programmes. 
Since millions of black people had been dispossessed 
of their land and their land rights under colonialism and 
apartheid, it was an urgent priority of the new democratic 
government to restore land to black South Africans. CPAs 
and other communal property institutions therefore occupy 
an important role in land reform. 
Communal Property Institutions (CPIs):
CPIs refer to a category of institutions that hold and manage 
land collectively. CPAs and Trusts are just two types of CPIs.
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only in ‘non-traditional communal areas’ (CLTP 2014: 10–11). 
The policy envisages that ‘traditional councils’ will get title deeds 
(i.e. full ownership) of pieces of land, while individuals and 
families will get ‘institutional use rights’ to parts of the land within 
traditional councils’ land. While the DRDLR says these institutional 
use rights will allow people to hold traditional councils accountable, 
there is no indication of how this will be possible if titles are first 
transferred to traditional councils (Claassens 2014). The CLTP 
also states that the traditional councils will own and control all 
development related to common property areas, such as grazing 
land and forests. Traditional councils will furthermore be in charge 
of investment projects such as mining and tourism ventures  
(CLTP 2014: 4). 
The CLTP privileges the demands 
of the traditional leadership lobby 
over people’s desire to choose the 
kind of land-holding entity that best 
suits their needs, such as CPAs. 
There is an indication that CPAs will be phased out in some parts 
of the country. According to the DRDLR’s most recent policy on 
communal land tenure and on CPAs (published 8 September 
2014), CPAs will be discouraged from forming on any land where 
traditional councils already exist (mostly the former homelands). 
In February 2014, Minister Nkwinti told the Portfolio Committee 
on Rural Development and Land Reform that CPAs and Trusts 
were ‘sophisticated institutions imposed on our people’ (Weinberg 
2014). Such statements belittle the struggles of people around the 
country who want to be able to choose the property institution that 
best suits their needs, and who have pointed out that traditional 
leaders’ lack of accountability is at odds with living customary 
law. People in rural areas have expressed alarm at the DRDLR’s 
intention to preclude Communal Property Associations (CPAs) from 
forming in the former homelands (National Land Workshop 2013). 
The idea that new CPAs should not be established in areas where 
traditional councils exist began to inform government policy after 
the publication of the Status Quo Report on Traditional Leadership 
FIG. 2 Simplified version of Wagon Wheel Diagram produced in the Communal Land Tenure Policy, published by the Department of 
Rural Development and Land Reform, 8 September 2014. (diagram by Tara Weinberg).
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and Institutions (2007). This report recorded traditional leaders’ 
objections to CPAs on the basis of their claim that only traditional 
leaders are the rightful landowners in the former homelands and 
that the existence of land-holding CPAs undermines their authority. 
By denying people the ability to choose the land-holding entity 
that best fits their tenure practices and needs, the DRDLR’s policy 
on CPAs and communal tenure forces people living in the former 
homelands to live under the thumb of traditional leaders while 
other South Africans can choose to opt in or out of this system.
The refusal to allow CPAs within the former homelands, read 
together with the Communal Land Tenure Policy (2014), indicates 
that government intends to transfer title to traditional councils 
as opposed to other land-holding entities or individuals. Yet 
the Restitution Act provides for restitution for those who lost 
land because of prior discrimination. Therefore the intended 
beneficiaries of land restitution might be a different group of people 
from those making up ‘traditional communities’ which, according 
to the TLGFA, is composed of people whom the traditional leader 
claims to fall under his or her jurisdiction. 
In its current form, the Communal Land Tenure policy proposal 
of 2014 threatens groups like the Makuleke, who do not identify 
with the traditional council boundaries from the apartheid era. The 
policy therefore undercuts a primary purpose of the Restitution Act, 
which was to identify and provide redress to those who suffered 
forced removal.
!
The Makuleke community was forcibly removed from the north of the Kruger National Park to vacant South 
African Development Trust land that had been assigned to the Mhinga Tribal Authority. Chief Adolf Mhinga, who 
was a Gazankulu Cabinet Minister, played a pivotal role in their removal, although the Makuleke’s own traditional 
leaders strongly opposed the move. Since 1994, Mhinga has continued to claim that the Makuleke fall under 
his jurisdiction. Despite opposition from Mhinga, the people of Makuleke eventually managed to file a successful 
restitution claim and had the land restored to their CPA. 
By the middle of 2014, the wheels of traditional leaders’ claims 
had begun to turn. President Jacob Zuma told the House of 
Traditional Leaders on 27 February 2014 to line up their lawyers 
and prepare to lodge claims for land restitution. King Goodwill 
Zwelithini kaBhekhuzulu announced in July 2014 that he would 
make a large land claim ostensibly on behalf of the Zulu nation. 
King Zwelithini’s claim will be managed by the Ingonyama Trust 
Board (ITB), which was the outcome of a deal between the 
National Party and the Inkatha Freedom Party during the dying 
days of apartheid. The ITB already holds close to 3 million hectares 
of land in KwaZulu-Natal. Through its proposed new land claim, 
the Trust intends to acquire much more land in KwaZulu-Natal, 
as well as in the Eastern Cape, Free State and Mpumalanga. 
In addition to King Zwelithini, traditional leaders of the Hlubi 
(KwaZulu-Natal) as well as the Rharhabe and Thembu (both 
Eastern Cape) have also stated their intentions to lodge restitution 
claims. These claims may be found to be invalid on the basis that 
most of them take as their date of dispossession, a date before the 
Restitution Act’s cut-off date of 1913. The claims are nevertheless 
likely to create confusion and uncertainty on the ground, making 
the security of tenure of people in rural areas, especially women, 
even more vulnerable.
The discouragement of CPAs in the 
former homelands is not just a matter of 
prospective policy; it is already happening. 
!
In the Eastern Cape, at least three CPAs have been waiting for their land titles since 2000, even though all the 
necessary forms were signed by the Minister. Despite a court order in May 2013 compelling the DRDLR to transfer 
the land to the Cata CPA, it has still not done so. The Masakhane and Iqayiyalethu CPAs, located south of Alice 
in the Eastern Cape, have also waited fourteen years – and they continue to wait. While lack of capacity and poor 
management within the DRDLR are certainly related to the delays in land transfers to CPAs, it seems that there 
is also another agenda at play. One of the underlying reasons for the non-transfer of land to CPAs emerges in an 
affidavit from the Cata CPA’s court case:
The practicalities in the facilitation of the transfer of the land have been cumbersome and have now 
encountered fierce objections by the traditional leaders who state that the agreements transferring ownership 
of rural land to community-based associations undermined their authority. In various discussions with 
traditional leaders they are resolute in objecting to the transfer of land falling under their authority to CPA. 
The land in question falls under Chief Ulana and in order to get a long lasting solution it is imperative that 
Chiefs should accept the process.3
Members of the Cata CPA have barely heard of Chief Ulana. The traditional leaders they recognise have been fully 
supportive of the transfer of title to the CPA. Some of them sit on the CPA committee. 
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The Cata case suggests that one of the main reasons for the delay 
in transferring land to CPAs is that the government is committed to 
pandering to the demands of the traditional leader lobby, including 
the Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (Contralesa). 
This lobby wants exclusive ownership and control over land in the 
former homelands. At the same time, the government’s attitude 
towards CPAs reveals a serious reversal of policy commitments that 
emerged during the 1990s, which supported black people’s right 
to choose how to best to constitute themselves as groups.
A lack of capacity (human and financial)  
to support land reform beneficiaries
The re-opening of the window in July 2014 to lodge restitution 
claims has re-initiated conversation about the DRDLR’s poor 
track record in supporting and communicating with restitution 
beneficiaries, including CPAs. It is commonly believed within the 
DRDLR that CPAs have failed, exemplified by Minister Nkwinti’s 
speech at a Land Tenure Summit convened by DRDLR in 
Johannesburg in September 2014 (Weinberg 2014). CPAs are 
indeed struggling. In its 2011–2012 report on CPAs, the DRDLR 
surveyed around 1 000 CPAs in the country and noted that they 
were struggling to function and needed more support. 
However, scholars and community activists alike have pointed out 
that CPAs have struggled because of a lack of support from the 
government and not because they are so inherently flawed that 
they cannot succeed. As a participant in the first session on CPAs 
at the Land Tenure Summit argued, ‘it is not that CPAs have failed 
agrarian reform, but agrarian reform that has failed CPAs’. The 
current CPA registrar’s office is small and under-resourced. This 
has led to a range of problems. Government officials tasked with 
helping to set up CPAs often cut and paste constitutions from other 
CPAs, leading to a lack of connection between land tenure practices 
on the ground and the CPA’s constitution. The CPA office has not 
communicated adequately with land reform beneficiaries or with 
parliament – since it was established eighteen years ago, it has 
published only three annual reports (2009–2010; 2011–2012; 
2013–2014). 
The delay in the transfer of title deeds to CPAs has been a result of 
the DRDLR’s bias towards agreeing to traditional leaders’ demands, 
as well as a major symptom of the DRDLR’s failure to support 
CPAs. CPAs still waiting include the Magokgwane, Bakubung 
ba Ratheo, Bakwena ba Molopyane and Goedgevonden CPAs in 
North West, the Mawubuye Umhlaba Wethu and Mahubahuba 
Bakone CPAs in Mpumalanga, and the Tladi and Gamawela CPAs 
PHOTO 2 Members of the Mawubuye Umhlaba Wethu CPA from Barberton, Mpumalanga, inspect the land they have claimed (2013)
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in Limpopo (LAMOSA 2013). In a report on CPAs released by 
the DRDLR in 2011–2012, the DRDLR admits that the failure 
of most CPAs is related to lack of support – in terms of human 
capacity, training programmes and financial aid – from the side of 
the government. But since this admission is not widely publicised, 
CPA committees often find themselves faced with angry members 
who question why the development money has been so long in 
coming and accuse the committee of ‘eating the money’ themselves 
(Interview with Mawubuye Umhlaba Wethu CPA 2013). The delay 
in the transfer of title generates an atmosphere of distrust within the 
CPA, which generates new conflicts and worsens existing conflicts 
within the group.
CPA committees often find themselves 
faced with angry members who question 
why the development money has been so 
long in coming and accuse the committee of 
‘eating the money’ themselves.
Exclusion of most people in rural areas from 
the ability to make decisions about land
Under the DRDLR’s new set of policies, people’s land rights under 
communal tenure have been made more conditional and less 
secure. The DRDLR’s justifications of the conditions attached to 
communal tenure rights are paternalistic (i.e. they exclude people 
from the decision-making around land). According to the new 
policies, the only way to acquire financial support for land received 
through a land reform programme is through the Recapitalisation 
and Development Policy Programme (RDPP). The RDPP needs 
applicants to prove ‘productivity’ on the land. ‘Productivity’ is not 
defined, meaning that the process is open to arbitrary decisions 
and manipulation by officials. In this way, recent policies allow 
people less choice about restitution and their own development.
Regarding restitution, the Parliamentary Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Legacy of the 1913 Land Act pointed out that land reform is not 
about agriculture only, and productivity should not be measured 
in terms of commercial agricultural viability only. The Committee 
added that ‘it is vitally important that land reform should address 
the various needs of the beneficiaries, for example, those [who] 
want land for residential purposes’ (Ad Hoc Committee 2013: 
21). Post-settlement support ‘should also not only be seen in 
terms of the Farmer Support Programme (FSP) or the existing 
Recapitalisation and Development Programme which targets 
farming with strategic partnerships’ (Ad Hoc Committee 2013: 21).
...the intention of previous land reform laws 
was to recognise and secure the underlying 
rights of these categories of people, not 
render them tenants in perpetuity...
By making restoration conditional on cost and productivity, the 
implication of the new policies is that land ownership is neither 
appropriate nor allowed for most people living in the former 
homelands (DRDLR 2013). Instead, ownership is reserved for a 
small elite, condemning most people to a system of provisional 
tenure and state leasehold that is essentially the same as the ‘trust 
tenure’ imposed by the South African Development Trust in terms of 
the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act.  
The ownership status of most of the land in the former homelands 
is reflected in the Deeds Registry as owned by the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa. Much of this land is held in trust by 
the state on behalf of specific groups of people who were prohibited 
by law from owning it outright because of their race (Budlender 
and Latksy 1991). There are a variety of such trust arrangements, 
some providing rights equivalent to ownership for groups who 
had purchased the land historically, others acknowledging long-
term historical occupation of the land, and others providing lesser 
occupation rights (Budlender and Latsky 1991). The new policies 
try to convert such rights to conditional leasehold or ‘institutional 
use rights’.4 The CLTP states that if land is transacted, households 
will be compensated only for ‘land-related investments rather than 
the land itself’ (DRDLR 2013). This flies in the face of the IPILRA’s 
guarantee that people be compensated for any loss of occupation, 
use or access rights to land. In a similar vein, the State Land Lease 
Policy provides that tenure awards granted to labour tenants and 
farm occupiers should take the form of long-term leases conditional 
on the payment of a nominal rent (DRDLR 2013: SLLP). Yet the 
intention of previous land reform laws was to recognise and secure 
the underlying rights of these categories of people, not render them 
tenants in perpetuity.
The central fallacy of colonial thought on customary land tenure 
was that it confers no property rights in land. This fallacy has 
been subsequently internalised and used for similar purposes 
by post-colonial governments (Okoth-Ogendo 2008). Instead 
of addressing the legacy of the 1913 Land Act and other 
such laws, recent land reform policy appears to mimic some 
of the Land Act’s modus operandi. Unfortunately, Catherine 
Cross’ (1991: 95) assessment of the government’s approach 
to communal land tenure in the 1980s has resonance with 
land laws and policies introduced over the last decade: 
‘Faced with collapsing policies and apparently desperate, the 
state has turned towards sweeping tenure innovations of a 
free market character within the homelands framework.’
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There is an ongoing debate among analysts as to why the 
government has failed to introduce legislation that would lay the 
foundation for resolving land issues faced by millions of people 
living under communal tenure. One of the difficulties is that the 
government does not act as a single body – officials within the 
government often hold differing views that are in tension with one 
another. Bearing that in mind, this section discusses some of the 
factors that might inform the state’s poor record on communal 
tenure reform.
Land reform lacks resources
Land reform in general is underfinanced and lacks adequate 
human capacity (Cousins and Hall 2013; Ntsebeza 2008). It 
makes up only 1% of the national budget, most of which goes 
towards the land restitution programme, in which thousands of 
claims must still be settled (Cousins and Hall 2013). The budget 
figures indicate that the government is not prioritising this aspect 
of development, despite its rhetoric to the contrary (Cousins 2013; 
Cousins and Hall 2013).
Government prioritises investors
The failure of communal tenure reform has occurred in the context 
of the government’s ‘neoliberal’ economic turn. Since 1999, the 
government has increasingly taken on board proposals by lobby 
groups like AgriSA, which have argued that investors would be 
scared off by any systemic changes to South Africa’s property 
system. They have emphasised the importance of private property 
rights as the most secure and attractive form of land tenure to 
investors. The government’s latest land laws and policies make it 
clear that it intends to prioritise investor security over the security 
of tenure of most people living in the former homelands. White 
commercial farmers – and to a lesser extent, emerging black 
commercial farmers – are the only groups reaping the benefits of 
South Africa’s land reform programme (Cousins 2014).
  
... government’s latest land laws and 
policies make it clear that it intends to 
prioritise investor security over the security 
of tenure of most people living in the former 
homelands.
These trends are outlined in the National Development Plan (NDP), 
which states that the priority for land reform will be the ‘transfer 
of agricultural land to black beneficiaries without distorting land 
markets or business confidence in the agribusiness sector’ (NDP 
2011: 206). The trends are also evident in the RDPP, which is 
now the only form of financial support for land reform (including 
restitution) beneficiaries (Cousins 2013). In order for these funds 
to be released, applicants must show that they have a business 
plan and a ‘strategic partner’ (Cousins 2013). Strategic partners 
are usually commercial farmers and BEE-accredited business 
people from the private sector (Cousins 2014). Many of the 
business people involved in strategic partnerships, especially 
around mining, are also closely tied to traditional leaders. The 
requirement of a business plan and strategic partner does not bode 
well for beneficiaries with limited resources. Research has shown 
that money released through the RDPP has sometimes benefitted 
strategic partners at the expense of land reform beneficiaries 
(PLAAS 2013).
Government and experts ‘know best’
As this article has mentioned, an attitude of paternalism has 
characterised much of the government’s response to questions 
of land tenure reform in communal areas. In the process, the 
government consolidates the power of economic and political 
elites (black as well as white) and further excludes people in rural 
areas from decision-making about land reform. This has led to an 
assumption that government and ‘experts’ know what is best,   
and a failure to adequately consult people in rural areas about what 
laws and policies would work best for them.
6. EXPLAINING THE FAILURES OF THE CLTP
Land reform makes up  
1% of the national budget.1%
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Political insecurity drives policy
A sense of political insecurity on the part of the ruling party, the 
African National Congress (ANC), could also be behind some of 
the DRDLR’s decisions. This was particularly relevant with the 
reintroducing of the Restitution Act just before elections. In the 
context of claims by opposition parties like the Economic Freedom 
Fighters (EFF) that land reform has failed, the ANC was pointing to 
the Restitution Act (and simultaneously distracting from the failure 
of land reform more generally) to say it is taking action.
Perceived power of traditional leaders 
The ruling party’s insecurity has also played a major role in the rise 
of traditional leaders in South Africa, including attempts through 
laws like the CLRA to give them increased power over land. Marais 
(2011: 424) argues that the ANC is trying to get the public to buy 
into their version of custom and tradition, in the hopes of preventing 
the development of rising dissatisfaction with the government, 
leading to a ‘crisis of authority’ and threatening the ANC. 
Mahmood Mamdani (1996) has argued that South Africa is 
experiencing the continuation of ‘decentralised despotism’ 
(indirect rule by the state through traditional leaders), which was 
entrenched by colonial and apartheid governments. Since other 
African countries have experienced similar spurts in traditional 
leaders’ powers post-independence, South Africa is not exceptional. 
However, traditional leaders’ powers in post-apartheid South Africa 
are not merely a continuation of their positions in the previous 
era. The government’s tendency to give more power over land to 
traditional leaders is linked to South Africa’s specific economic and 
political conditions over the past twenty years (Ntsebeza 2008).
The government (and this includes many opposition parties in 
parliament) has the impression that traditional leaders have 
widespread support in rural areas and therefore can bring them 
votes (Ntsebeza 2008; Oomen 2005). For example, in 2013 
South Africa’s main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), 
announced across multiple media platforms that AbaThembu King 
Buyelekhaya Dalindyebo had left the ANC to join their ranks (SAPA 
2013). It is unclear why the DA would create a media frenzy 
around recruiting Dalindyebo, opposed to any ordinary member, 
unless they saw him as a significant figure who could bring them 
votes. Research has long disputed the assumption that traditional 
leaders carry widespread support in rural areas (Ntsebeza 2008; 
Oomen 2005). Regardless, political parties’ impression of rural 
areas as in the hands of traditional leaders has persisted. 
Political parties’ belief in the power of traditional leaders is informed 
by a number of factors: 
• The ANC’s desire to placate traditional leaders initially 
(in 1994) came from a fear that the IFP would mobilise 
traditional leaders to respond violently and boycott elections, 
as they had done in the lead up to the 1994 election (Oomen 
2005; Ntsebeza 2008).
• The ANC’s brushes with the IFP in the early 1990s have led 
the ANC to try to woo the IFP’s voters in KwaZulu-Natal by 
pandering to traditional leaders (Oomen 2005).
• During the anti-apartheid era, the ANC struggled to establish 
democratic structures in rural areas that challenged traditional 
leaders.(Oomen 2005; Ntsebeza 2008). This had made the 
ANC uneasy about its knowledge of and reach within rural 
areas, especially the former Bantustans (Oomen 2005). 
• The ruling party’s uneasiness with its rural base has 
increased as people in rural areas have become more and 
more disenchanted with local government officials and the 
failure of service delivery. There has been a spike in service 
delivery protests since 2009 (Municipal IQ 2014). 
• In the absence of responsive local government, some people 
in rural areas have turned to traditional leaders – often out of 
desperation (Ntsebeza 2008). As a result, some traditional 
leaders have gained greater authority, as without them 
people cannot get, for example, proof of address letters that 
are necessary to apply for social grants. But many people 
also have not approached traditional leaders, even though 
government officials have failed them.
• When the ANC first came to power, its initial assumption was 
that traditional leaders who were ‘allies’ (that is, those who 
resisted the Bantustan system and supported the ANC) would 
work with them and accept ‘ceremonial’ roles (Ntsebeza 
2008). However, it soon became clear that traditional leaders 
would not accept the replacement of tribal authorities with 
democratically elected structures to manage land in the 
former homelands (Ntsebeza 2008).
• Traditional leaders have very strong lobbying power in the 
form of Contralesa. This has meant that traditional leaders’ 
views have infiltrated the government’s thinking on communal 
land tenure reform, while the voices of people in rural areas 
have either gone unheard, been ignored or aggressively 
silenced. An example is the former president of Contralesa, 
Phatekile Holomisa, who is an ANC MP and has been vocal 
in his support for the TCB. 
• There are significant economic interests at play in the 
government’s courting of traditional leaders. Over the past 
ten years, it has emerged that many of the former Bantustans 
are much richer in minerals than the apartheid government 
believed (Claassens 2014). In particular, there is a rush for 
platinum, chrome and titanium in Limpopo and North West. 
There are also deposits of coal in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-
Natal and rare earth metals in the Eastern Cape. 
• The government also favours traditional leaders because it 
is very convenient for themselves and mining companies to 
negotiate with a single individual or institution to acquire land 
for mining – that is, a traditional leader or traditional council 
– and avoid the ‘messy’ and complex process of negotiating 
with all the components parts of a community who can later 
hold them to account (Claassens and Matlala 2014). 
In the process of traditional leaders’ elevation, people living in the 
former homelands have become ‘subjects’ with second-class land 
rights (Claassens 2014).
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7.  AN ALTERNATIVE VISION FOR LAND REFORM:    
THE ROLE OF COMMUNAL LAND TENURE
Engage with rural people
The challenges facing communal tenure areas are complex and 
difficult. The law can only take us so far, as tenure security 
derives as much from ‘locally legitimate landholding’ sites as from 
legislation (Okoth-Ogendo 2008). By ‘locally legitimate landholding’ 
sites, Okoth-Ogendo means that people depend on friends, relatives 
and residents in their local area to recognise and reaffirm their land 
claim – and to protect their claim from being thrown out. However, 
this does not justify the government pretending to consult, but in 
reality ignoring inputs by people in rural areas. The government 
must fundamentally change its approach towards land reform if 
it is to honour the Constitution’s principles and meet the needs 
of people in the former Bantustans, who make up nearly a third 
of the country’s population. A key priority would be to engage 
constructively and transparently with the suggestions for land 
reform put forward by people in rural areas.
The government must fundamentally 
change its approach towards land reform if 
it is to honour the Constitution’s principles 
and meet the needs of people in the former 
Bantustans, who make up nearly a third of 
the country’s population.
Recent research shows that people in the former homelands are 
engaged in attempts to find positive ways to reconcile citizenship 
rights and indigenous precedents. An example of this is the way in 
which rural women are redefining land rights in the context of living 
customary law. According to the stereotypes of official customary 
law, men were the only people entitled to inherit and manage land 
(although this was contested as far back as the 1930s) (Weinberg 
2013). Using evidence from surveys, parliamentary submissions 
and interviews at community workshops, Claassens and Mnisi-
Weeks argue that single women in the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal 
and the North West have increasingly been allocated residential 
sites since 1994 (Claassens and Mnisi-Weeks 2009). These 
changes have occurred as a result of local processes of struggle and 
negotiation around land rights led by women.
As the nominal owner and trustee of most communal land, the 
state has a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests (and not on 
behalf) of rural people. To do so it must relinquish some of its 
decision-making and landownership power to people living in rural 
areas, while at the same time playing a support or facilitation role 
where necessary.
Build on the IPILRA
A combination of stakeholders, including non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs), 
have suggested that to strengthen and recognise rural people’s 
land rights we can build on an already existing law: the Interim 
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA). The IPILRA helps 
to protect people whose informal rights to land are threatened, but 
its impact has been limited in practice because some traditional 
leaders believe that they own the land and this is not disputed 
by the DRDLR. The IPILRA’s enforcement has also been difficult 
because many DRDLR officials do not know what it is or how 
to work with it. To more effectively protect rural people against 
the deprivation of their land by traditional leaders and private 
enterprises such as mining companies, the act would need to be 
amended so as to: 
• be made a permanent law (it is currently renewed annually);
• protect individuals within families and households from 
decisions being made without their consent; 
• explicitly recognise and protect women; 
• allow for inquiries if there are disputes about the disposal  
of land.
Ultimate authority for the enforcement of the IPILRA lies with  
the state, which is the nominal owner of most of the land in the 
former Bantustans.
 
Make different land tenure options available
An additional important tenet of a new communal land tenure 
policy would be to offer people a spectrum of land tenure options 
from which to choose, including the involvement of communal 
property institutions and rights on state-owned land that are legally 
protected. The spectrum of land tenure options should not be 
narrowed to traditional councils, as this article has already argued. 
It should also not be narrowed to individual title deeds. 
As Cousins et al (2005) have argued, a blanket push for individual 
property rights can lead to a single household member gaining 
exclusive access to and control of land, to the detriment of other 
household members. Individual titling can therefore lead to greater 
insecurity for people who have less power in the household, such 
as women. At the same time, since individual title deeds are 
still often the most valued kind of property-holding – due to the 
historical factors outlined in the first section of this article – they 
cannot be discarded as an option for land reform beneficiaries 
only, while still retained as an option for other people. Such a 
policy would be discriminatory.5 The spectrum of land tenure 
options should be broadened and should apply equally to all South 
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Africans. If the state threw its authority behind forms of tenure 
other than only private property and traditional council ownership, 
it would go at least some way to strengthening the security of those 
forms of tenure. 
Strengthen the system of land administration 
The state also has a responsibility to set up a better-capacitated 
and more stable land administration system. This would include 
increasing capacity to resolve the urgent and serious problems 
facing groups in rural areas regarding the protection of their land 
rights via communal property institutions – including its failure 
to honour existing commitments and court awards to CPAs. 
The DRDLR should support initiatives within communities to 
democratise land-holding structures, and make an informed 
decision about the structure they wish to use to manage land. 
Put pressure on the state
While the state is an essential role player, others play an important 
function in putting pressure on the state to change its agenda. 
NGOs, CBOs, as well as groups and individuals in communal 
areas, have vital roles to play in this regard. They can open the 
political space for mobilisation around the realisation of security of 
tenure, provide visions for an alternative social order, and support 
people in rural areas in their struggles against laws and practices 
that undermine their land rights (Cousins and Hall 2013). 
8. CONCLUSION
People living in the former homelands – in areas where the 
government understands ‘communal land tenure’ arrangements to 
exist – continue to continue to have insecure land rights. Instead of 
introducing legislation to secure the rights of people living in these 
areas, the post-apartheid government has courted commercial 
farmers (with their economic clout) and traditional leaders (with 
their supposed ability to bring in votes). The state has also failed 
to engage in a transparent and accountable way with the solutions 
put forward by rural constituents. Legislation on its own will not 
solve the problem of insecurity of land tenure but it will provide 
people in rural areas with a much stronger base from which to 
make claims on land. 
There is a great deal at stake in developing communal tenure 
legislation that meets the needs of people living in the former 
homelands. In areas like the platinum-rich North West, traditional 
leaders and mining companies are lining their pockets while most 
people lack access to basic services. In many other rural areas, 
most people are in limbo, unsure of whether they can use the land 
on which they live and are vulnerable to ‘exploitation through the 
abuse of custom or denial of access to state institutions’   
(Okoth-Ogendo 2008: 99). In this environment of uncertainty 
women have suffered most – as they did in the past. 
The reason for the government’s approach seems to be rooted in its 
sense of political insecurity in rural areas and the lobbying power 
of economic interests and traditional leaders. The government has 
not seriously interrogated the property system it inherited in 1994, 
with its skewed emphasis on the superior nature of individual 
property rights and its negation of alternative forms of land holding. 
Instead, the government has reinforced the existing property system 
by making the rights of people in the former homelands conditional 
on ‘good behaviour’ while reserving ownership for powerful elite 
partners such as traditional leaders. A deep irony is that the 
restitution programme, which was designed to provide redress to 
those who suffered forced removal and bore the brunt of the Land 
Act, is now being reconfigured in a way that might consolidate the 
power of elites. 
While land reform is complex, NGOs, CBOs and people in rural 
parts of the country have already played an important role in 
articulating some solutions. It is up to the government to engage 
with these visions respectfully and transparently.
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